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研究生: 張宏億
研究生(外文): Hung-Ye Chang
論文名稱: 不同市場情況下公司規模對銀行放款之影響
論文名稱(外文): Company size to the impact of bank loans in different market conditions
指導教授: 吳如萍
學位類別: 碩士
校院名稱: 樹德科技大學
系所名稱: 金融與風險管理系碩士班
論文出版年: 2011
畢業學年度: 99
語文別: 中文
論文頁數: 51
中文關鍵詞: 資訊不對稱市場情況公司規模成立年資
外文關鍵詞: Information asymmetryFirm sizebank LoanCorporate finance
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銀行的存在是緩和資金需求者與資金供給者之間的資訊不對稱,而市場情況之不同銀行對公司審查重點也有所不同。本研究以2000年至2009年上市公司為樣本,從成立年資、有形資產比率、研發費用率、營收成長率等等,探討銀行在公司規模不同下對授信條件之間的影響。實證結果顯示:(一)在不同市場情況下成立年資及有形資產比率對放款有顯著的正向影響(二)研發費用率及營收成長率對放款有顯著的負向影響(三)稅前淨利率對放款在小規模公司有正向影響。

Banks help to resolve information asymmetric between users and suppliers of funds. Owing to differences in market conditions, bankers focus differently on corporate financing. In this study, we use Taiwan stock market listed companies as samples during the period from 2000 to 2009. The company''s established seniority, asset size and finance are factors that influence bank loans in different market conditions between the company''s credit and lending impact. Empirical results indicate that banks decided to provide loans as long the loan to be given was more as the amount of tangible assets as collateral. Higher R&D companies pose higher risks and therefore bank lending would be less. On the other hand, banks lending most based on the collateral providing. However, the companies with small size contain scarce resources. Banks are more concerned about collateral than profit of companies that perform well in the market.

目錄
中文摘要  i
英文摘要  ii
誌謝  iii
圖目錄  vi
表目錄  vii
第一章 緒論  1
1.1 前言  1
1.2 研究動機與目的  2
1.3 文章架構  3
第二章 文獻探討  5
2.1股市多、空頭之分類  5
2.2 公司規模與年資  6
2.3 銀行貸款  7
2.4 逆選擇  7
2.5道德風險  8
第三章 研究方法與設計  9
3.1 多頭、空頭市場之區分  9
3.2 銀行借款比率  11
3.2.1 借款總額  11
3.2.2 借款比率(1):金融借款÷借款總額  11
3.2.3 借款比率(2):金融借款÷負債總額  11
3.3 公司規模大小  12
3.4 審查變數  12
3.5 產業別分類  14
3.6普通最小平方法(OLS)回歸分析  14
第四章 實證分析與結果  15
4.1 敘述統計結果  15
4.2回歸分析結果  26
第五章 結論與建議  47
一、中文文獻  49
二、英文文獻  49



一、中文文獻
王健安,(2002)。集團企業中的銀行角色之研究,台灣財務金融學會年會論文。
沈中華與王健安,(2001)。從風險資訊結構的觀點探討銀行經營績效與往來企業的關係,存款保險資訊季刊 ,第十五卷第二期第11-31頁。
陳昱成與劉維琪,(2005)。聲譽效果與投資,財務金融學刊,第十三卷第三期第33-51頁。
陳家彬,(1999)。台灣地區銀行基本放款利率之訂價:模型與實證,台大管理論叢,第十卷第一期第39-63頁。
陳家彬與賴怡洵,(2001)。台灣地區銀行放款有無擔保之決定因素-Logit模型之實證分析,管理評論,第二十卷第一期第129-159頁。
陳錦村,(1997)。競爭、往來關係與銀行授信行為之研究,中國財務學刊,第五卷第三期第61-90。
陳錦村與張雁萍,(2002)。問題放款的形成、解決途徑與執行效果,國立中央大學研究所碩士論文。
劉啟群與陳建樺,(1998)。上市公司管理當局自願性盈餘預測揭露及揭露時點之影響因素-台灣地區之實證分析,財務金融學刊,第六卷第一期第1-43頁。
賴怡洵、陳家彬與何加政,(2008)。台灣地區銀行進入企業董監事會之決定因素:代理成本與放款者利益衝突假說,管理學報,第二十五卷第一期第1-30頁。
二、英文文獻
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Barnea, A., R. A. Haugen and L. W. Senbet, (1980). A Rationale for Debt Maturity Structure and Call Provisions In the Agency Theoretical Framwork, Journal of Finance, 35, 1223-1234.
Bathala, Chenchuramaiah T., Kenneth P. Moon, and Ramesh P. Rao, (1994). Managerial Ownership, Debt Policy, and the Impact of Institutional Holdings:An Agency Perspective, Financial Management, 23, 38-50.
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Booth, J. R.,(1992). Contract Costs, Bank Loans, and the Cross-Monitoring Hypothesis, Journal of Financial Economics, 31, 25-41.
Chen, Carl R., and Steiner, Thomas L., (1999). Managerial Ownership and Agency Conflicts: A Nonlinear Simultaneous Equation Analysis of Managerial Ownership, Risk Taking, Debt Policy, and Dividend Policy, The Financial Review, 34, 119-136.
Crutchley, Claire E., Marlin R.H. Jensen, John S. Jahera, Jr. ,Jennie E. Raymond,  (1999). Agency problems and the simultaneity of financial decision making: The role of institutional ownership, International Review of Financial Analysis, 8, 177-197.
Diamond, D. W., (1984). Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, Review of Economic Studies, 51, 393-414.
Diamond, D. W., (1991). Monitoring and reputation: the choice between bank loans and directly placed debt, Journal of Political Economy, 99, 689-721.
Fabozzi, F. J. and J. C. Francis, (1977). Stability Tests for Alphas and Betas over Bull and Bear Market Conditions, Joumal of Finance, 32 , 1234-1250.
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